BY GABRIEL MOHAMMED SHUWA ESQ.,AICMC, MCAI
- Introduction
On 29 July 2026, the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC), in Complaint No. BB/LPDC/1314/2024, directed the suspension of J-K Gadzama, SAN from legal practice for a period of three years. The Committee found that he improperly took over another lawyer’s brief, engaged in client solicitation, and wrongfully appropriated professional fees. The gravity of the sanction, coupled with the stature of the practitioner involved, immediately drew attention not merely to the merits of the decision but to the procedural pathway available for its challenge.
Following the decision, Gadzama indicated his intention to file a direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 11(8)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act. On a literal reading of the statute, such a course might appear permissible. However, the contemporary judicial position has rendered that route effectively foreclosed. What emerges from this situation is not simply a failed appeal strategy, but a deeper structural crisis within the disciplinary framework governing the legal profession in Nigeria.
This article contends that the combined effect of the Supreme Court’s refusal to entertain direct appeals from the LPDC and the failure to constitute the Appeals Committee of the Body of Benchers has produced a jurisdictional vacuum of serious constitutional and institutional consequence. The problem is no longer theoretical. It is immediate, practical, and capable of undermining the legitimacy of disciplinary control within the profession.
- The Settled Position of the Supreme Court
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has now firmly settled the question whether appeals lie directly from the LPDC to that Court. The answer is in the negative. In Osuji v. Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (2025) 17 NWLR (Pt. 2014) 317 at 340 to 345, the Court undertook a detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such appeals. This position was not treated as tentative or exploratory. It was expressed in categorical terms and grounded in a strict construction of appellate jurisdiction.
The issue resurfaced in the Supreme Court’s review proceedings in Jide Aladejobi v. Nigerian Bar Association (2026), where the appellant urged the Court to depart from its earlier reasoning and revert to the position suggested in Obiajulu Nwalutu v. Nigerian Bar Association & Anor (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 174 at 198 to 199; (2019) LPELR 46916 (SC). The Court declined this invitation and reaffirmed its earlier stance. It emphasized that jurisdiction is not a matter of convenience or perceived necessity, but one of strict legal competence. Where jurisdiction is absent, no amount of statutory interpretation that runs contrary to constitutional structure can confer it.
This reasoning aligns with the classical exposition in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 at 348; (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587, where the Supreme Court held that a court is competent only when it is properly constituted, the subject matter falls within its jurisdiction, and the case comes before it initiated by due process of law. The absence of any one of these elements is fatal. Applying that principle, the Supreme Court has now made it clear that, notwithstanding the language of Section 11(8)(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, a direct appeal from the LPDC does not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold required for the Court’s intervention.
The implication is stark. Any attempt to invoke the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction directly from an LPDC decision is not merely defective but constitutes an abuse of court process. This doctrinal clarity, however, has not resolved the problem. Instead, it has exposed a deeper structural deficiency.
- The Statutory Appellate Path and Its Collapse in Practice
Having declined jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has pointed practitioners toward what it considers the proper appellate forum, namely the Appeals Committee of the Body of Benchers as provided under Sections 11(7) and 12 of the Legal Practitioners Act. This position reflects the long-standing principle that the right of appeal is purely statutory, as affirmed in Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 at 75. A litigant must bring himself strictly within the enabling statute. No court has the authority to create a right of appeal where none exists, nor can it assume jurisdiction on sympathetic grounds.
In theory, therefore, the appellate structure is complete. The LPDC makes determinations at first instance, and an aggrieved practitioner proceeds to the Appeals Committee of the Body of Benchers. In practice, however, this structure collapses entirely because the Appeals Committee has not been constituted. The statutory pathway exists only on paper. It is, for all practical purposes, a legal fiction.
This disconnect between statutory design and institutional reality lies at the heart of the present crisis. The law directs practitioners to an appellate body that does not exist in any functional sense. The courts, on the other hand, decline to fill that gap by assuming jurisdiction. The result is a system that recognizes a right without providing a means of enforcing it.
- The Jurisdictional Vacuum and Its Constitutional Implications
The absence of a functioning appellate mechanism creates what can only be described as a jurisdictional vacuum. This vacuum is not merely procedural. It strikes at the foundation of the rule of law. A practitioner who is sanctioned by the LPDC finds himself in a position where no effective avenue exists for challenging the decision. He cannot approach the Supreme Court because jurisdiction has been denied. He cannot approach the Appeals Committee because it has not been constituted. The right of appeal is therefore rendered illusory.
This situation is inconsistent with the principle expressed in Ariori v. Elemo (1983) 1 SCNLR 1 at 24; (1983) 1 SC 13, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. The existence of a legal right presupposes the availability of a remedy. A system that creates rights in form but denies remedies in substance cannot be sustained within a constitutional democracy.
The implications extend further into the domain of fair hearing under Section 36 of the Constitution. In Adigun v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678 at 709, the Court emphasized that fair hearing is not limited to the conduct of proceedings at first instance. It encompasses the entire adjudicatory process, including the availability of appellate review where provided by law. Where a statutory scheme contemplates an appeal but fails to make it operational, the fairness of the entire process becomes questionable.
The disciplinary jurisdiction of the LPDC is undoubtedly essential for maintaining professional standards. However, the legitimacy of that jurisdiction depends on the availability of safeguards against error. Without a functional appellate mechanism, disciplinary decisions risk acquiring a degree of finality that is neither intended by statute nor acceptable in principle.
- Institutional Consequences for the Legal Profession
The implications of this vacuum for the legal profession are profound. At the most immediate level, it results in the effective denial of the right of appeal to practitioners who are subject to disciplinary sanctions. This is not a theoretical concern. It affects real cases, real reputations, and real livelihoods. The inability to challenge an adverse decision undermines confidence in the fairness of the disciplinary process.
Beyond the individual level, the situation creates the risk of unchecked finality in LPDC decisions. While the Committee is composed of distinguished members of the profession, it is not immune from error. The absence of appellate oversight means that mistakes, whether procedural or substantive, may go uncorrected. Over time, this could erode the credibility of the disciplinary system.
There is also an institutional dimension to the problem. The Body of Benchers, as the apex regulatory authority of the legal profession, bears responsibility for ensuring that the structures established by the Legal Practitioners Act are operational. The failure to constitute the Appeals Committee represents not merely an administrative oversight but a significant institutional lapse. It signals a disconnect between statutory obligation and practical implementation.
Ultimately, the credibility of the legal profession depends on the integrity of its regulatory mechanisms. A disciplinary system that lacks a functional appellate component risks being perceived as arbitrary, even where its decisions are substantively justified.
- Judicial Intervention and the Role of Mandamus
In circumstances where a statutory body fails to perform a duty imposed upon it by law, the courts possess the power to compel performance through the prerogative order of mandamus. This principle is well established in Nigerian jurisprudence. In Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40 at 56, the Supreme Court affirmed that mandamus will lie to compel the performance of a public duty where the applicant has a sufficient legal interest. The same principle was reiterated in Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 at 636, where the Court emphasized that public authorities are bound to act within the law.
More recently, in University of Ilorin v. Oluwadare (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 751 at 781, the Court underscored that where a statute imposes a duty, the courts will not hesitate to enforce it. Applying these authorities, there is a strong basis for seeking an order of mandamus compelling the Body of Benchers to constitute the Appeals Committee. The duty to establish the Committee is not discretionary. It is mandatory. Its non-performance has direct legal consequences for practitioners affected by LPDC decisions.
Judicial intervention in this context would not amount to an intrusion into the internal affairs of the profession. Rather, it would constitute the enforcement of a statutory obligation necessary for the proper functioning of the disciplinary system.
- Practical Remedies for Affected Practitioners
Pending the resolution of the structural defect, practitioners affected by LPDC decisions must navigate a difficult legal landscape. Those currently facing proceedings may raise objections to jurisdiction on the ground that the disciplinary framework is incomplete without a functioning appellate mechanism. In Okafor v. Attorney-General, Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) 659 at 681, the Court recognized that defects in the adjudicatory structure can affect the validity of proceedings.
Practitioners who intend to appeal may adopt a protective approach by initiating proceedings to preserve their rights while simultaneously seeking an extension of time within which to appeal once the Appeals Committee is constituted. The principle governing such applications was articulated in Bowaje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 SC 143 at 147, where the Court acknowledged that time limits may be extended in the interest of justice.
For those already sanctioned, the avenue of judicial review remains open. In appropriate cases, it may be argued that the absence of an appellate mechanism amounts to a denial of fair hearing, thereby rendering the decision liable to be set aside. The decision in Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 at 618 provides a useful foundation for such arguments, particularly in relation to the procedural fairness of disciplinary proceedings.
- The Way Forward
The resolution of this crisis requires coordinated action at multiple levels. The most immediate step is the constitution of the Appeals Committee by the Body of Benchers. This is a straightforward administrative act with far-reaching legal consequences. Its absence cannot be justified in light of the statutory mandate.
At the same time, the courts must be prepared to exercise their supervisory jurisdiction where necessary to compel compliance. The Nigerian Bar Association also has a critical role to play in advocating for institutional reform and ensuring that the rights of its members are protected.
In the longer term, legislative intervention may be required to clarify the appellate structure and provide alternative mechanisms in the event of institutional failure. Such reform would enhance the resilience of the disciplinary system and prevent the recurrence of similar crises.
- Conclusion
The current state of the law presents a troubling paradox. The Supreme Court has correctly insisted on the limits of its jurisdiction and declined to entertain direct appeals from the LPDC. At the same time, the statutory body designated to hear such appeals has not been constituted. The result is a jurisdictional vacuum that undermines the right of appeal, compromises fair hearing, and weakens confidence in the disciplinary framework of the legal profession.
This situation is incompatible with the rule of law. A legal system cannot sustain a structure in which rights exist without remedies and obligations are imposed without corresponding safeguards. The urgency of the moment demands decisive action. The Body of Benchers must fulfill its statutory duty. The courts must be ready to enforce that duty where necessary. Until this is done, the integrity of the disciplinary system will remain in question, and the profession itself will bear the consequences.
Gabriel Mohammed Shuwa Esq is a Corporate Governance Practitioner and Public Policy analyst based in the Federal Capital Territory.
Shuwagabriel@gmail.com